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This review article explores three interconnected texts written in the 1920s and 
1930s by the German intellectual Ernst Jünger: Copse 125, Total Mobilisation and 
The Worker. Dominion and Form. They contain his original analyses of the 
relationship between war, destruction, organisation and technology. Jünger argued 
that entering the realm of total organisation, that is, organisation which claims its 
ground to be scientific, calculated, planned, rationally-administered and 
technological, destruction is subtly appropriated into, and thought of, as a process of 
production. Jünger understood war as an increasingly ‘necessary’ and permanent 
requirement of the politics of peace and freedom. He anticipated the transformation 
of destruction into a major field of experimentation with, and through, complex 
state and private organisational networks (civilian, military and corporate), and 
into a prime arena of scientific, technological and managerial development. 
He analysed the emergence of new political discourses and systems whose 
common ground was to invoke permanent insecurity, risks and dangers and 
claim the need to manage the peaceful existence of liberal societies. 
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This review article introduces to scholars of organisation studies three works 
by Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), one of Germany’s most celebrated writers on war 
in the 20th century: the volume of war diaries entitled Copse 125, from the 
summer of 1918 (Jünger, 1930a); the essay Total Mobilisation, from 1930 
(Jünger, 1930b); and the major synthesis of 1932, The Worker. Dominion and 
Form (Jünger, 1981). Writing nearly a century ago, Jünger would have understood, 
and greeted most enthusiastically, the thematic of this special issue. How might 
his analyses still be relevant today when war seems to have changed so much 
and in so many ways? The answer comes from the congruence of his concerns 
with those of this special issue. He was interested in how military, political, 
economic and scientific agencies had formed a new alliance that brought war 
under the sign of technological, organisational and scientific mobilisation. 
Equally central was the question of the expansion of war’s spatial reach to 
become truly ‘planetary’ both in physical and in political terms. He wrote, in a 
brief note added in 1980 to Total Mobilisation, that ‘The rearming of the world 
powers has attained planetary weight; to it corresponds the potential of all 
armament’ (Jünger, 2015: 142). He too was preoccupied by the changing ethos of 
war both in macro-political terms and in the minute details accompanying the new 
relationship between humans and machines which was rendering war into 
technologically-driven work. Also, he saw the increasing danger of war deriving 
from the appropriation of destruction under the spell of a specifically modern 
and unparalleled confidence in the rationality of mass-production, technological 
progress and their cor- responding managerial processes and organisational forms. 
A recent instance showing the affinity of Jünger’s analyses with current 
events and concerns emerged in a discussion at a panel at the annual meeting of 
the Association of the US Army in Washington, on 4 October 2016. Addressing 
the possibility of direct conflict among military super- powers, two of United 
States’ top commanders (Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, deputy chief of staff for 
operations, plans and training, and his deputy, Maj. Gen. William Hix) argued that 
such a conflict (between the United States, Russia and China) would be ‘lethal 
and fast’ – and the ‘stopwatch’ would not be under control. Considering the 
possibility of a ground war accelerated by artificial intelligence and precision 
weapons, Maj. Gen. Hix explained that 
 
The speed of events is likely to strain our human abilities. The speed at which machines 
can make decisions in the future is likely to challenge our ability to cope, demanding 
a new relationship between man and machine. (Defense One, 2016) 
 
The similarity between these comments and Jünger’s analyses is significant. 
Witnessing the wholesale annihilation and self-mutilation which first befell 
Europe a century ago, he understood that its sources point to deeper and more 
disturbing historical processes. For him, that war brought to the fore the same 
enchantment with power expressed in the will to the technological acceleration of 
organised destruction we witness even more emphatically today. What struck 
Jünger, perhaps more than anything else in World War I (WWI), was the way in 
which the relentless pursuit of destructive power was turning technology into a 
self-destructive force against its very creators who remained unable to understand 
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what was unfolding through their own actions. He notes, in diaries from 1918, 
 
No – war is not a material matter. There are higher realities to which it is subject. 
When two civilized peoples confront one another, there is more in the scales than 
explosives and steel. All that either holds of any weight is in the balance. Values are 
tested in comparison with which the brutality of the means must – to anyone who has 
the power to judge – appear insignificant. A strength of will, all-embracing and 
concentrated to the last pitch in the highest untamed expression of life asserting 
itself even in its own annihilation, is brought into play. (Jünger, 1930a: ix–x) 
 
WWI was fought not only between armies but also between the systems of 
modern science, engineering and production. Machines had triumphed, and in 
the name of their ‘rational power’, human life could be blindly gambled away. 
Jünger recognised the formation of what President Eisenhower would call, in 
1961, ‘military-industrial complexes’. He thus turned his attention to an 
organisational analysis of war: what happens when it becomes a planned, 
calculated, organised, work-like ‘performance’, an enterprise to be administered 
with minimal exertion and risk to one’s own ‘assets’, whose operations and 
processes are to be executed with ‘surgical precision’, from a distance and 
preferably with means that overcome limitations of physical geography – features 
of military work recognisable a century later? The answer, truly frightening to 
Jünger, was that war is transformed into an instrument integral to the arsenal of 
peace itself, inextricable from the continu- ous expansion of organisation and 
order, of security, and thus a necessary guarantee of ‘universal freedom’. 
In 1970, the philosopher George Steiner wrote that 
 
Ernst Jünger came nearer than any other writer, nearer even than the poets, to forcing 
language into the mould of total war. … The chaotic hell of the Somme and 
Langemarck grew into more than a searing memory or an instance of life turned 
lunatic. The fire-storm of the big guns, the moon-landscape of craters and flares, the 
somnambular frenzies of hand-to-hand fighting, seemed to Jünger to compact 
certain essential truths and mysteries in man. After such battle there could be no 
peace, only an armistice. (In Jünger, 1970: 7) 
 
This is not a simple compliment: Steiner captures the direction of Jünger’s 
works about war. In this sense, WWI had been only a fragment of what was to 
come. War was not incongruent with the expansionist economic and political 
tendencies of global powers. And the most frightful aspect was its new political 
legitimation: war should be left to reason, technology and their progress as the 
ultimate defenders of freedom. 
Jünger saw WWI as the threshold of a new age of belligerence, the 
inauguration of ‘nothing short [than] a century of death’ (Malesevic, 2010: 120). 
‘The war that will end war’, as H. G. Wells (1914) wished it, had been but ‘the war 
that ended peace’, as Margaret MacMillan (2013) argued a century later. For 
Jünger, the war of a century ago was a sign of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (2005) 
uncanny diagnosis, in 1888, that modernity will enter a phase in which ‘there will 
be wars such as the earth has never seen’ (p. 144). Instead of an empty prophecy, 
for Jünger this was an insight into the indissoluble bond taking shape between the 
central promises of modern individualism and of Liberalism (promises of 
security, freedom and unlimited self-assertion) and the permanent mobili- sation 
of war against any imaginable danger (or risk) that might threaten them. 
In this sense, as part of his emerging critique of bourgeois liberalism and 
modernity, Jünger’s writings about WWI differ from its mainstream poetic and 
metaphysical interpretations. For most authors, the slaughter could have had only 
one meaning: to reveal that war was an alien, aberrant, event in the history of 
civilised, modern, indeed humanistic, Europe. While Jünger dwells, like others, 
on the macabre imagery of destruction, mutilation and death, unlike theirs, his 
visions are harder to decipher. For one thing, his profound indignation with 
technological death and its claims to rational organisation are expressed in almost 
heartless, cold and detailed descriptions. Moreover, there grows in parallel a 
complex imagery of the cosmic relevance of war: being under fire gener- ates an 
atmosphere of dramatic intoxication, an eruption of powers in which humanity 
reveals its demonic capacity to engage with elemental forces. For Jünger, war is 
a discovery in which he revels because it seems to offer a spectacle of the forges 
and workshops in which history itself is being stamped out and synthesised in a 
clearer expression than peace can offer. At times, there is no human community 
left, for him, other than in the monumental and devastating suffering of the 
trenches. An ambiguous aesthetics of heroic death seems to haunt Jünger’s 
writings, and Walter Benjamin (1979a, 1979b) seized it in his review of War and 
Warrior, in 1930, pointing out that the mystification of war was coming 
dangerously close to the imagery of emerging Fascist ideologies, even though he 
had himself been impressed by Jünger’s war diaries and deployed similar images 
in short writings of the 1920s (Benjamin, 1979a: 103–104). In the event, Jünger 
never became a fascist or a national-socialist; to the contrary, he rejected all the 
advances of the Nazis to join their movement, extensively documented by 
Jünger scholars such as Paetel (1949), Hervier (1978, 2014) and Kiesel (2007). 
But he remained, at the same time and like so many German intellectuals at the 
time, a patriot and fervent critic of the German humiliation at Versailles and the 
Weimar regime’s incapacity to govern. 
Jünger’s stark and uncomfortable vision of war admits perhaps a different kind 
of analogy: one between his texts and Francisco Goya’s paintings and drawings of 
the Spanish Civil War a century earlier (in works between 1808 and 1812) and of 
the cultural decadence of Europe in the Black Paintings for the period 1819–
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1823. Akin to Goya’s visions of the brutality and certainty of fini- tude in Saturn 
Devouring His Son and of decadence in The Pilgrimage to San Isidro, Jünger’s 
vision of war and its place in modern culture was also driven by a sense of its 
inevitable recurrence, echoing that of Nietzsche (1968) who, concluding a note 
of 1888, wrote, ‘life itself is a conse- quence of war, society itself a means to 
war’ (p. 33). Jünger went further: having experienced a war of the kind Nietzsche 
anticipated, he recognised, both in it and in Nietzsche’s thinking, the philo- 
sophical heritage of one of the founders of Western thought, Heraclitus: 
 
One must realize that war is shared and Conflict is Justice, and that all things 
come to pass and are ordained in accordance with conflict. (Heraclitus of Ephesus, 
1979: 66–67, Fragment LXXXII) 
 
He returned frequently to Heraclitus’ fragments on war because he 
understood them not as pointing to an inherent belligerent instinct. For him, 
Heraclitus does not praise war but rather clari- fies the most pressing question 
about it: how does war reflect those historical moments when social, political 
and cultural orders fail to grasp that their self-assurance has crossed the threshold 
towards hubris, and the limits of a certain system of values have been reached? 
 
Copse 125: the soldier as ‘worker of destruction’1 
Jünger spent 1351 of the 1547 days of the war in the trenches where he kept 
copious, detailed, notes and diaries covering 567 days, in their vast majority, days 
of battle (Schöning, 2014: 42). Copse 125 (subtitled A Chronicle from the 
Trenches of 1918) followed his famous In Storms of Steel (cov- ering the period of 
the Somme battles – Jünger, 1930d, 2003b). However, Copse 125 is not strictly a 
battle diary; it covers about six weeks of relative calm in the summer. His 
company had been ordered to defend a small piece of land around a small copse of 
trees (‘Bois du Rossignol’ on civil- ian maps), near a village in Belgium: 
 
It had not the least strategic importance, and yet at that time it had a meaning for all 
Europe as a local symbol of power where many lines of fate intersected, and against 
which were set in motion a strength in men and machinery that could have reclaimed a 
whole province. Hence it is well worth while to make it the point of a survey whose 
aim it is to reach beyond the episodal to the universal. (Jünger, 1930a: xi) 
 
Although a complicated task, he combines these levels of analysis with ease, 
operating beyond ‘political’ commentaries or lamentations. Instead, Jünger seems 
to have retained a measure of san- ity by connecting daily trench life to the wider, 
deeper transformations represented by the war. The analysis is based on 
observations of the central characteristics of war in transformation. The first 
theme is technology, ‘the triumphal march of the machine’ (Jünger, 2001: 53). 
The second is the changed space of war through the excessive growth of 
destructive power over physical distance, transforming the geometry of military 
strategy away from seeking direct engagement with the enemy in battle, towards 
seeking the enemy’s sheer annihilation with minimal engagement. Third, central 
for Jünger was the re-organisation of the human subject at war into a mere 
extension servic- ing mechanical power, a phenomenon understood more 
profoundly by soldiers than by their commanders. They saw their humanity 
erased from the calculations of strategists and specialists who instead asked for 
more and more factory-produced death through machines of unprecedented 
annihilation. Assaulted continuously from every angle, soldiers knew that they had 
become merely another form of material, another kind of military consumption 
to be expended as required. By 1917–1918, decisions to go over the parapets 
were increasingly based on risk calculations deter- mined by artillery fire and 
distances: 
 
It was as if, when coming out of the trenches, we knew exactly what was waiting for 
us. Because danger appeared like a mathematical formula – ascertained and calculated 
like everything related to the machine. (Jünger, 1929: 27) 
 
As he was recording the details of the organisation and management of war, 
Jünger began to trace how the relationship between technology and power was 
being reconfigured around the pri- macy of a cold ethics of calculation in which 
industrial production was becoming a decisive agency of destruction. He therefore 
also understood that industrialised war was not simply an interruption of the ‘long 
peace’ and of the ‘Concert of Europe’ (following the Congress of Vienna in 
1815). Rather, war expressed the same expansionist yearning for power, that 
‘permanent and supreme aim of [modern] politics’, as Arendt (1946: 601) argued 
in her reflections after World War II (WWII). Analysing technology beyond its 
material appearances, following Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘will to power’, 
war revealed a much deeper transformation of the conception of human power and 
mastery over the world: 
 
In order to understand this, one must have a clear conception of the nature of machinery. 
It is an expression of the human will to master matter. We see every day in all branches 
of industry how a new miracle of mind fused into steel abolishes at a stroke all that has 
gone before. There is no pause. All is movement, pushing relentlessly and madly 
forward. (Jünger, 1930a: 134) 
 
Mastery over the world through machines was integral to modernity as a 
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Western project: ‘To assemble immense energy in a small space and with it to 
conquer distance – such is the expression of our will to power’ (Jünger, 1930a). 
And yet, the more strategists relied on the sheer mass of firepower as decisive, 
the more battles stalled and fronts came to a standstill. The experiences on the 
Somme had shown how the mere possession of increasing amounts of firepower 
was not going to be decisive; on the contrary, the possession of pure mechanical 
fire, while appearing to provide flexibility in its deployment, actually had the 
opposite effect: 
 
Here we had the picture of the great battle of automata which consists in this – that two 
strongly organized and yet at all points highly mobile zones of power, whose molten 
edges flow into one another, attempted to turn each other from an ordered array into a 
chaos of useless iron and enervated mobs. (Jünger, 1930a: 24) 
 
Copse 125 analyses, from the frontline, the new alignment between production 
and destruction, and the shift of military decision and organisation towards the 
primacy of technological systems. Incapable of seeing the one-sidedness of this 
calculus, military commanders demanded that states mobilise their entire systems 
of industrial production for the continuous accumulation of fire- power. 
Defying all the laws of military economy, technological power could only bring 
about a paralysis of the frontlines, as well as exhausting the human energy and 
will to fight. Jünger grasps that something new had emerged from these endless 
battles of material. He shows how the domina- tion of technological death had 
begun to change the ethos of war among soldiers. In permanent danger of being 
simply used up in the consumption of raw materials for the production of mechani- 
cal destruction, they understood the historical essence of the war; they no longer 
saw themselves as soldiers, but as machine operators, as workers claimed by 
the mechanical logic of a line of production akin to that of the factories 
manufacturing these infernal devices. By the summer of 1918, they all knew that 
the war’s 
 
… length as well as the unimagined violence of its phenomena made far more and quite 
other demands on our powers of endurance in body, soul, and spirit than we had 
foreseen. Months became years, and the pomp of battle a daily round of hard work. 
But at the same time the war, too, became a usual instead of an unusual state of affairs 
and dug itself permanently into us. (Jünger, 1930a: viii) 
 
They had become ‘long since habituated to an existence that made the utmost 
possible demands, and was already inwardly and outwardly set in that mould that 
answers to a new age and its new methods’ (Jünger, 1930a: x–xi). Technological 
war had forged a type of ‘soldier-worker’ ‘such as before could never have been 
dreamt of’: 
 
It arose when the spirit of the machine took possession even of the battlefields of 
Europe, and the flying man and the man in the tank and the scientifically trained 
leader of the raid squad appeared. (Jünger, 1930a: 3) 
 
However, as battle acquired the character of technologically-driven work, 
Jünger maps a change in soldiers’ experience of themselves. Fear of the distant 
and continuous assault of the machines began to combine with an instinctive 
understanding that a new kind of agency had become avail- able to each of them. 
If a soldier could comprehend the logic of the machines, it would bestow not 
simply flexibility and ‘readiness’ for effective reaction, but would also allow a 
rapid work-like fusion of human skill with technology and its requirements. He 
wrote, in a shorter sketch based on his diaries, 
 
We have to transfer what lies inside us onto the machine. That includes the distance and 
ice-cold mind that transforms the moving lightning stroke of blood into a conscious 
and logical performance. What would these iron weapons that were directed against 
the universe be if our nerves had not been intertwined with them and if our blood didn’t 
flow around every axle? (Jünger, 1929: 84) 
 
This was a sign of a future transformation: soldiers becoming total fighting 
units, ready to be deployed within an organised system of pure apparata, 
driven by centralised decision-making based on criteria of pure technological 
rationality. The new soldier is not a warrior, but a technical operator, a 
mechanical specialist, capable of understanding both how instruments are made 
and how they are to be used. ‘All turns’, Jünger (1930a) wrote, ‘on mobility, 
effective fire, and protec- tion; […] on propulsion, automatic fire, armament. To 
these must be added changing requirements such as noiselessness, camouflage, 
protection against gas, wireless communications, and a hun- dred more’ (p. 132). 
This prescient observation of the re-organisation of combat in its most minute 
details offers one of the earliest characterisations of combat operations now 
recognisable, in retro- spect, in the wars of the 20th and 21st centuries. The aim of 
engagement in battle is not to die as a hero; the heroic no longer lies in personal 
sacrifice. The true achievement is mastery of the techno- logical means for the 
destruction of the inimical ‘other’. 
Technology and its logic had changed war irrevocably. As a consequence, one of 
the fundamen- tal transformations he anticipated was that of the spaces of war, in 
terms of the shape of localised theatres of operation, but also of strategic 
regional and global penetration of technological war. Instead of fixed lines, ‘The 
right [image of combat] is that of a network into which the enemy may certainly 
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penetrate here and there, but where he will at once be overwhelmed from all 
sides by a web of fire’ (Jünger, 1930a: 23). The image of a ‘network’, or ‘web’, 
captured the new organisation of military work: ‘It is a question no longer of 
launching men in mass, but machines – that is to say, death in a concentrated form 
that only yesterday put at our disposal’ (Jünger, 1930a: 130). A novel combination 
of devices had rendered the fixed spaces of battle obsolete: the first systematic use 
of automatic rapid-fire weaponry on a mass-scale; the obsessive increase in the 
power, distance and strategic authority of artillery; the use of poison gas (despite 
the Hague agreements of 1899 and 1907) as a means of mass-destruction; and 
the emergence of tanks and aviation (however primi- tive) as new means of 
movement. 
For Jünger, it was not the novelty of each of these instruments that gave them 
their significance (apart from tanks, all had already established histories he 
understood well). It was the coordination of systems of such weapons that was 
becoming decisive and against which only a new kind of organisation could 
offer a chance of survival. Thus emerged raid, or shock, patrols (Stoßtruppen, 
introduced by the German army in 1915, and adopted by all parties on the Western 
fronts by 1917): small commandoes infiltrating static lines through rapid and 
stealthy movement, using portable machine guns and grenades, supported by 
unreachable heavy artillery. Jünger realised that this would be the only role of 
direct human involvement in future technological wars, a feature clearer today 
when combat unfolds almost exclusively in this form: interventions driven by air 
power from remote, centrally organised platforms on land or sea, using 
increasingly unmanned, remotely-con- trolled means. Human intervention tends 
to be reduced to special forces deployed in small (and, preferably, secret) teams 
in preparation for air strikes, followed by patrols operating from strictly 
delimited local bases when technological options against guerrillas in urban and 
civilian centres, or difficult terrain, are exhausted. This form of combat has 
become central to the comprehensive US and UK military doctrines in 2013 and 
2014: the core principles are those of overwhelming offensive power, to be 
supported by shock commando action, flexible, mobile, under central com- mand 
(Chief of the Defence Staff, 2014; Joint Publication 1, 2013). The political failure 
of military campaigns in the last two decades has made the deployment of soldiers 
an even less viable option; it is therefore likely that this manner of combat will 
continue to feature as central to official mili- tary doctrine. 
Copse 125 remains remarkably contemporary, especially at a time of conflicts 
originating in the permanent urgency of the global ‘war on terror’, when interests 
are never simple, or ‘local’. The growth of the technological basis of war and of 
highly complex systems for the organisation of concrete operations by weaponry 
whose range and intent are inherently ‘planetary’ (especially as direct human 
intervention is increasingly taking place at a distance, through the operation 
of drones, or long-range missile systems, for example) are features whose 
genealogy merits revisiting from the perspective of organisational analysis. 
 
Total mobilisation and the consolidation of war as ‘public 
good’ 
Published in a collection of studies edited by Jünger (1930c) himself, Total 
Mobilisation is an attempt to understand the transformation of the body-politic of 
the state in the vacuum left by the disintegration of monarchic systems in Europe 
and Asia.2 Was the ‘wasteland’ left in the war’s wake as barren as it seemed? For 
Jünger, its outcome was the entrance onto the historical stage of a different mode 
of legitimation of new kinds of imperial politics: a modern, secular, technological 
affirmation of power and order at national and global levels. On one hand, there 
emerged the radi- cally modern revolutionary ideologies of Communism, 
Fascism and National-Socialism; on the other, there emerged the consolidated 
economic and political power of a new self-confident Liberalism in the shape 
of a global and historically decisive United States. 
Jünger was fully aware of the profound differences between the particular 
contexts of various combatant states before and after the war. He observed 
closely the political agencies and systems of ideas, first in Communist Russia, 
then in Weimar Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, followed by the rise of National-
Socialism. He understood that, despite claims to a unique calling, they sought 
historical sustenance in a common ground characterised by an even more intense 
drive to global expansion and belligerence: 
 
When we consider the world as it has emerged from the catastrophe – what a unity of 
effect, what measure of strict historical consistency! […] The old bells of the Kremlin 
have been tuned to the Internationale. In Constantinople, children spell the old 
arabesques of the Koran in Latin script. In Naples and Palermo, Fascist police rule 
the affairs of southern life according to the principles of modern traffic. (Jünger, 1930b: 
26–27) 
 
For Jünger, the common call was to ‘total mobilisation’: the channelling and 
management of the entire force of the nation, the ‘people’, or the ‘proletarians of the 
world’, into a process of production and self-production driven by the highest 
possible level of technological and managerial order. The legacy of the war was a 
new sentiment of power triggered by the colossal quantities of destructive material 
and energy unleashed on the battlefields of Europe. It revealed, in his view, the 
integration of war in a vision of power characterised by the rational and 
progressive organisation and manage- ment of existence through the ‘extension 
of the perspective of utility into the infinite’ (Jünger, 1930b: 13). The 
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continuous increase in control and mastery over the production of energy was 
becoming the primary political platform for promises of ultimate emancipation 
from any constrain- ing bonds to either nature or transcendence. Aligning social, 
political and economic orders to this principle captured the essence of his concept 
of mobilisation, which Jünger understood as that kind of thinking driven 
relentlessly to seize matter, movement and force through the formalism of tech- 
noscience, and subject them to human organisation. ‘Progress’ had already been 
mobilised by all sides as the most effective propagandistic theme during WWI: ‘the 
special nature of this great catas- trophe [was] that in it, the genius of war was 
penetrated by the spirit of progress’ (Jünger, 1930b: 11). None of the other faiths 
could muster the political and cultural force that progress could: 
 
Perhaps these slogans bore a crude and tawdry colour, but there can be no doubt about 
their effectiveness; they recalled the coloured rags with which the prey is directed 
towards the guns. (Jünger, 1930b: 17) 
 
A new combination of agencies, civilian and military, public and private, 
mobilised across Europe, expressed not just the willingness to experiment with 
increasing means of destruction but also the transformation of war into a domain 
in which ‘new problems extorted fresh spasmodic exertions’, into an open and 
terrifying laboratory. ‘The capacity for the speedy development of a large 
programme [of armament made] this war differ from all previous ones in that it 
[was] not fought out on one fixed plan’ (Jünger, 1930a: 137) but on the 
assumption that all resources have to be directed towards, and managed for, the 
war: 
 
A mobilisation of such extent could not be foreseen by human understanding. … In the 
course of the war this process intensified: as examples, we can cite the planned 
exploitation of raw materials and subsistence means, the conversion of employment 
relationships into military ones, civil-guard duty, the arming of trade vessels, the 
unexpected extension of the authority of the general staff, the ‘Hindenburg programme’, 
Ludendorff’s struggle to amalgamate military and political command. (Jünger, 1930b: 
14–15) 
 
‘Programme after programme’ of organisational and technological 
experimentation, ‘whether justified or exploded by events’, took the form of ‘a 
test of endurance that taxes every section and every resource of the nations 
involved’ (Jünger, 1930b). This foreshadowed the form of future wars: 
inextricably linked to the demands of increasingly total and centralised 
organisa- tion of the production of energy. In this context, the figure of Walter 
Rathenau is significant in Jünger’s critique because it embodied the logic of 
total mobilisation as an early exponent of the origins of ‘the military-industrial 
complex’. Rathenau, a businessman, leader of AEG, initiated (on 13 August 
1914), and headed, the first integrated governmental body seeking to manage the 
entire German economy and align it to the war effort: the Kriegsrohstoffsamt 
(KRA – the Office for Raw War Materials). Rathenau (1917) saw it as a step 
towards his vision of the future: a totalising, state-led, ‘public economy’ 
(Allgemeinwirtschaft), expressing collective destiny beyond politics: 
 
War destroys the independence of the private economy and prepares future forms of 
the economy by making it possible that the economic interests of a civilized state are 
not affairs of the individual, but the concern of all. … The collective spirit of the 
nation, however, like every other spirit, expresses its vitality visibly through growth 
and increase. Growth means will to annihilate the other, for life lives from death. (pp. 
247–248, 295–296) 
 
His famous dictum – ‘not politics, but the economy is our destiny’ – meant that 
the integration of state and private economic interests had to become the 
fundamental principle for the manage- ment of all economic activities not simply 
as a matter of defence but as the essential source of a nation’s power. For Jünger, 
complete integration and organisation in the name of power were not the whim of 
a single figure; total mobilisation, as public necessity, was only just commencing. 
War had indeed shown itself to be a productive process, an integral part of the 
machinery of power. War’s entanglement with ‘national vitality’ was becoming 
central to the political, economic, social and cultural imagination: 
 
The organising force and the grip of industry, the work force of the mass, the 
national enrolment of finance, the superiority of science and its intimate binding to 
life itself, the development of culture as a whole – who could enumerate all that will 
be made to come together? (Jünger, 1930a: 137) 
 
This insight was echoed at the end of the century in Alvin Toffler and Heidi 
Toffler’s (1995) account of the coming ‘third wave war’ (pp. 73–93) in remarkably 
similar terms to Rathenau’s: ‘the way we make wealth’ will shape the outlines of 
future war, even though the authors seemed una- ware of the history of their 
interpretation (Toffler and Toffler, 1995: 64–65). Following WWI, new political 
regimes, from Left to Right, embraced total mobilisation as a call on all potential 
resources (the French slogan was, literally, ‘énergie potentielle’) to stand at the 
state’s command as guardian of ‘people’s security’, the new res publicum, in times 
of triumphal peace as well as war. Peace, the pre-condition of freedom, becomes 
thus dependent on a permanent programme of readiness of society for defence. 
For Jünger, WWI had been but a preparation for ideologies relying on perma- nent 
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readiness for defence as the systematic ground of political programmes 
compulsory for any ‘free’ nation. Political systems emerging from 1917 to 1919 
(and onward) succeeded in making total mobilisation appear as indispensable for 
securing the space for national ‘progress’ and ‘devel- opment’. This profound 
change of political culture meant that, under the ‘undisguised mask of Reason’, 
could be found the legitimation of a new kind of absolute state power which 
licensed a very concrete political programme: 
 
The task of total mobilization is the conversion of life itself into energy, as it manifests 
itself in business, technology, and transport, in the whirring of wheels, or in fire and 
movement on the battlefield. It is thus related to the potency of life itself. (Jünger, 
1981: 109) 
Total mobilisation can be articulated ‘in the name of the people’, as protection 
and affirmation of life, and it helped Jünger understand why total mobilisation 
claiming, on one hand, the univer- sality of reason, could become, on the other 
hand, an expression of nationalism. The rational organ- isation of life becomes a 
national necessity because it can be justified as indicator of national success 
and progress. For Jünger (1930b), however, it became a licence to 
 
… intrude in ways hitherto thought inconceivable; it spins around an artificial 
circular dialectic, but its movement unfolds on a simple level. It begins to subordinate 
peoples to forms which are no different from those of an absolute regime, with much 
reduced allowances for freedom and comforts. In many cases, the humanitarian mask 
has been almost stripped away, to be replaced by a half-grotesque, half-barbaric 
fetishism of the machine, a naive cult of technology – especially where there is no 
direct, productive relationship to those dynamic energies for which the destructive, 
triumphal course of long-range artillery and bomb-loaded fighter squadrons are only 
the military expression. (p. 27) 
 
Total mobilisation, therefore, does not indicate a military phenomenon, nor is 
it a quantitative concept to be understood in the military terms of universal 
conscription. Rather, mobilisation cap- tures the quality of power when it 
demands the concentration of the energies of the ‘people’ into a self-preserving 
unity, while its total character ‘will only occur when the image of military pro- 
cesses will be preordained for the order of the situation of peace’ (Jünger, 1930b: 
15). The essence of total mobilisation is its ‘measure of organisational thinking 
which is only an intimation of that higher mobilisation which the times are 
pressing upon us’ (Jünger, 1930b: 22). It indicates why modern existence could 
be managed, explicitly or implicitly, in totalising and totalitarian terms, in peace 
as much as in war. Total mobilisation is not one process or another, one place or 
another, one moment or other. It represents a new rhythm through which power 
claims universal mastery in the organisation and rationalisation of production and 
destruction alike: 
 
In this lies the secret of that brutal and unexpected speed with which America raised up 
whole armies and arsenals out of the ground itself once war was declared, and this also 
explains why the American engineer quickly proved himself to be readily adaptable to 
the Russian planned economy in its almighty transformation of an uncultivated soil. 
(Jünger, 1981: 148–149) 
 
Jünger’s argument is that progress and development provide a new political 
vocabulary in which existence appears both as a permanent source of conflicts 
and tensions, and as the theatre of increasingly rational, progressive solutions. The 
frenetic pace imposed by the process of mobilisa- tion is therefore not limited to 
emergencies but tends to become the rhythm of all existence and change is 
always urgent, always imperative, always optimistic. WWI had not been 
simply an extraordinary event, but a threshold beyond which the capacity to 
fuse organised destruction to organised production began to crystallise into the 
‘normal’ situation: 
 
Many instances can be mentioned in this sense: it is enough to consider our own life – 
fully unleashed in its merciless discipline, with its smouldering and glowing 
industrial districts, with the physics and metaphysics of its traffic, its motors, 
airplanes, and gigantic cities – to sense, with a feeling of horror mixed with 
yearning, that not a single atom is not at work here, and that we are ourselves most 
deeply bound up within this raging process. Total mobilization is far less something 
to be carried out, than something which carries itself out; it is, in war and peace, the 
expression of the mysterious and inescapable demand to which life in this age of the 
masses and machines subjects us. That is why each individual life becomes, ever more 
clearly, the life of a worker; and why the wars of the knights, the kings, and the 
bourgeois are followed by wars of workers – wars of whose rational structure and 
mercilessness the first great twentieth-century conflict has given us an omen. (Jünger, 
1930b: 15–16) 
 
Does the question of total mobilisation remain actual today when terrorism is 
seemingly always capable of penetrating ordered social spaces in utterly 
unexpected ways? If the end of the Cold War appeared to herald the hope of 
almost complete de-mobilisation and the possibility of envisaging global peace, 
the ‘war on terror’ brings to the fore the frailty of peace and security, the 
persistence of global tensions and of blocks whose antagonisms have the 
potential to generate conflicts of more terrifying scope given the technological 
means of destruction available. But terrorism has also revealed, perhaps even 
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more intensely, how rapidly the political stage turns to measures of internal total 
mobilisation and control. This is why Jünger’s thesis seems worth revisiting 
today, when war appears again as indispensable to the functioning of ‘peaceful’ 
societies: 
 
We see therefore how methods of rearmament are already tailored for total 
mobilisation. We can mention here phenomena like the increasing curtailment of 
‘individual freedom’, which admittedly is always questionable. We encounter this 
assault, whose tendency aims to deny anything that cannot be regarded as a function of 
the state, first in Russia and Italy, but then also with us; and it is foreseeable that all 
countries making global claims will do the same in order to unleash new kinds of 
forces. (Jünger, 1930b) 
 
This passage suggests how subtly the dialectic of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992, 
1999, 2009) has developed as a permanent feature of the modern way of life. The 
wars of the 21st century show the extent to which the abhorrence of risk has been 
integrated in contemporary political discourses. In the blink of an eye, states 
convert the protection of freedom into totalising forms of control of freedom 
itself, and thus licence themselves to wage war. The ‘war on terror’, one of the 
central justifications for military intervention, offers numerous examples. After 
the New York attacks in 2001, one of the central tenets of US policy and 
legislation was the establishment of new forms of comprehensive internal 
surveillance entailing a substantial re-definition of the sphere of individual privacy. 
The US Patriot Act of October 2001, entitled ‘Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism’, legitimised, in the name of freedom, the erosion of fundamental 
rights. Personal liberty, free speech, free association, legal representation and 
speedy public trial (for which Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendi- tion are 
eminent illustrations) – all became, in the United States, targets of a secretly 
revived National Security Agency and of a (very public) new Department of 
Homeland Security. The inter- national belligerence of the United States and its 
allies, with or without secure legal and diplomatic grounds, but always legitimated 
by any reference to terror, built up to the catastrophes now unfold- ing in so much 
of the Middle East. 
In turn, denouncing vaguely defined universal ‘enemies of Islam’ and seeking 
their annihilation, terror’s main weapon, the suicidal group or individual, appears 
as a far more primitive technologi- cal and organisational instrument. Able to act 
on just about any target, at any point, with the banal- ity of a cooking pot or an 
inconspicuous truck, terror in the 21st century is nonetheless far from 
‘primitive’: its actions are entirely dependent on technologies of 
communication and mobility (mobile telephony, Internet access, and aviation). 
Moreover, it is the capacity of terror to seize the power of danger and make it 
appear omnipresent that licences a new kind of ‘silent’, and increas- ingly 
comprehensive, internal total mobilisation of citizenry, especially at the level of 
communica- tions. The attacks in France and Germany in 2015–2016 have also 
brought to the fore calls to mobilisation not heard in Europe for seven decades. 
In France, for example, the number of indi- viduals seeking to join the army 
quintupled in November 2015 after the Paris attacks to around 1500 per day. 
After the Bastille Day attacks in Nice, the President announced the formation of 
a new National Guard (disbanded in 1872) and called again for French ‘patriots’ 
to enlist. In August 2016, the German interior ministry presented a proposal to 
the cabinet to reinstate compulsory national service and explore the formation of 
new structures of civil defence to support the army; discussions about the 
possibility of deploying soldiers on home soil followed the Munich shootings on 22 
July. 
 
The belligerence of peace: The Worker. Dominion and Form 
(1932) 
Jünger’s insights about the dangers of contemporary war emerge with more 
clarity in the volume which synthesised his critique of modernity in its most 
developed structure. The volume on The Worker is the systematic expression of 
Jünger’s thinking about the impact of world war upon the context of the 20th 
century (Jünger, 1981). It examines the shape of an emerging global political 
context characterised, as Arendt (1946) later argued, by ‘expansion, the political 
brain child of the businessman in despair, conceived as limitless and thought of 
as the leading new principle of the nation’s foreign policy’ (p. 603). For Jünger, 
to understand the new ‘merciless’ rational, techno- logical, scientific and 
industrial war presupposed a meticulous interpretation of the diffusion of 
modernity’s conception of power throughout social, economic and political 
discourses. Thinly veiled by claims to pursue peace, the escalating ambitions of 
new political systems could hardly conceal their main purpose: the limitless 
expansion of their grip on power. This marked, for Jünger (1930b), the essence of 
total mobilisation: ‘an act through which the widely ramified and richly veined 
currents of modern life can be marshalled, with a single flick of the switch, into 
military energy’ (p. 14). This comportment towards power inaugurated a new 
epoch of armed conflict on an unprecedented scale anticipated by Jünger as a 
central dimension of the unfolding of global politics in the coming century. It 
indicated the true depth of the dangers signalled by the war: a monstrous situation 
behind which began to operate, with regularity, a permanent conflictual state of 
affairs. Total mobilisation would not cease when military campaigns ended; 
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rather, it would become the mode in which modern life will come to be ordered: 
 
Thus the image of war as armed action is flowing increasingly into the intensified image 
of a gigantic work process. Alongside the armies meeting on the battlefields, there 
arise the modern armies of logistics, of alimentation, of the arms industry – the army of 
work in general. […] This absolute channelling of potential energy, which transformed 
industrial states into volcanic forges, is perhaps the starkest indication of the dawn of 
the age of work. (Jünger, 1930b) 
 
His argument was that ‘the Great War was fought not only between two 
groups of nations but also between two epochs’ (Jünger, 1981: 27). 
Unprecedented possibilities of mobilisation inti- mated by the war had grown 
into a new logic of politics. The acquisition and expansion of power became the 
principle governing all the spheres of human action. He sees this relatively rapid 
shift unfolding in countries as different as Russia, Italy and Germany, the 
United States and France. What they had in common, it seemed, was the 
formation of a new sense of imperial construction in the name of the ‘people’, a 
category no longer referring to any single individual but to the pro- tection of 
individuality as such, whose permanent assertion becomes the defining 
platform for incontestable political legitimation. He shows how individuality, 
translated in a language seeking to appeal to the productive core of society, 
explains the ways ‘in which all parties today designate themselves as workers’ 
parties’ (Jünger, 1981: 33). The claim to represent and protect society’s core by 
affirming its productive energies found fertile ground in politics and the 
economy; it was leading, in Jünger’s view, to the formation of a new rhythm of 
‘normal’ life. But what was the underlying nature of this process of 
normalisation? 
In The Worker, he pursues this question at multiple levels: in the emergence of 
a new politics of power expansion, as well as in a new understanding of the 
economy which has to be ready to mobilise against dangers that always 
threaten society and its progressive course. Besides the  
political and the economic, he explores the twin themes of danger and 
mobilisation through the technological, social, cultural, artistic and 
propagandistic diffusion of a permanent sense of urgency to plan, organise 
and manage against danger. Jünger’s analysis is one of the earliest to seize 
upon a theme which has since become central to national and global politics. The 
politics of security follows the subtle dissemination of a general sentiment that 
life is surrounded by the permanent potential of risks to be systematically 
avoided and eliminated. The state is called upon to undertake whatever is 
necessary to secure existence itself by the means of increased defensive 
resources. This major shift made clear, Jünger thought, that preparing for war 
would become one of the indispensable tasks of states who will always be able 
to invoke security as an ultimate and unassailable public good: 
 
… we must grasp the bourgeois [individual] as the one who sees security as a highest 
value and conducts his life accordingly. 
 
The supreme power through which he sees this security guaranteed is reason. The 
closer he finds himself to its centre, the more the dark shadows which conceal what is 
dangerous melt away, so that, sometimes when hardly a cloud seems to darken the sky, 
it fades into the distance. 
 
Yet danger is always present; it is forever searching, like an element, to burst through the 
dams with which order surrounds itself, and – according to the laws of a secret, yet 
incorruptible mathematics – it becomes more threatening and deadly to the same extent 
that order believes it has expelled it from itself. (Jünger, 1981: 24) 
 
Self-assured by a ‘progressive’ faith in the possibility of the completion of its 
project, the main effect of the politics of security is to force upon the world the 
principle of reason as the only legiti- mate basis for the organisation of both space 
and time, of both production and destruction: 
 
… the ideal condition of security, towards which progress strives, consists in the 
universal dominion of bourgeois reason which seeks not only to diminish the sources 
of danger, but ultimately to run them dry. (Jünger, 1981) 
 
Disguised as measures for the protection of security, offensive actions acquire 
unquestionable legitimacy. The rhetoric of military campaigns discovered a new 
propagandistic register that has now become the established idiom of 
international security politics: 
 
So it has become possible for wars to be waged nowadays without anyone noticing, 
because the stronger side prefers to describe them as something like peaceful 
penetration, or police action against bands of robbers – wars which exist in reality, but 
not in theory. (Jünger, 1981: 96) 
 
To these, the intervening decades have added ‘humanitarian interventions’ and 
‘humanitarian bombing’, ‘surgical strikes’, ‘nuclear deterrence’, ‘peace-keeping 
operations’ or ‘international policing operations’. On one hand, Jünger seeks to 
understand the movement towards a new world conflagration created by the 
failure of the peace settlement of 1919: 
 
From now on, however, even the secured precincts of order itself ignite like gunpowder 
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that has long lain dry, and the unknown, the extraordinary, the dangerous does not 
only become the familiar – it becomes permanent. After the armistice, which only 
appears to end the conflict, but in truth surrounds and undermines all the borders 
of Europe with whole systems of new conflicts, what remains is a situation in which 
catastrophe appears to be the a priori of a transformed thinking. (Jünger, 1981: 28) 
 
On the other hand, he signals a deeper and more significant aspect of the 
consolidation of war at the heart of emerging political philosophy. Jünger points 
out the permanent anxiety, the diffuse fear of any potential loss of control, that 
was shaping the modern soul. Modernity seems, among other features, to be 
intoxicated with the new feeling of liberation from constraints and discom- forts. 
Defending life’s new conquered comforts, a life lived ‘in a kind of pre-war 
belle époque’ (Jünger, 1981), indicates a specifically modern aspiration to 
limitless security as prerequisite of freedom. The political ideologies which 
followed in the wake of WWI found in this theme the most fecund aim and 
justification for permanent readiness to wage war against any perceived danger: 
 
And there is no mistaking the weakness behind slogans like ‘peace and order’, 
‘national community’, ‘pacifism’, ‘economic peace’, ‘agreement’, in short: behind the 
last appeal to the reason of the Nineteenth Century – they belong to the vocabulary of 
restoration, whose constitutions resemble peace treaties spread like thin, temporary 
veils over an intensified progression of the rearmament. (Jünger, 1981) 
 
Reading The Worker today would show, perhaps even more than eight 
decades ago, its acute relevance with regard to the theme of this special issue: 
namely, that the waging of war finds abun- dant cover under causes formulated in 
the name of safeguarding the space of modern comforts, of universal rights and 
limitless security. In other words, the text opens up once again some of the 
more fundamental problems connected to the licensing of violence in the name 
of organising the world, of managing it in such a way that unlimited freedom is 
secured for the very specific ‘way of modern life’. To this end, the drive to 
manage always contains within its essence the demand to drive out all that 
appears contrary to it. Securing the organised character of the world, and waging 
war in the name of its protection, is not simply a reflection of the nature of 
things as they are. Rather, Jünger saw it as the imposition of an ethical 
programme whose central demand is that all social and political entities ought to 
follow a common order. The drive to total organisation is thus, for him, the drive 
for the preservation and expansion of a particular order of power. This order’s 
principle, in Jünger’s interpretation, is that freedom is realised only when the 
autonomy of calcula- tive reason prevails. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The texts presented here highlight the dangerous tendency towards war in the 
century that followed WWI. For Jünger, new relationships between agencies, 
technologies, processes, as well as the space and ethos of war had profoundly 
changed its nature and heralded a historical phase in which war would become an 
even more enormous and intense enterprise. The technoscientific and politi- cal 
authority of reason would bring war, Jünger anticipated, under the same principles 
of manage- rial, material and ethical ordering of industrial mass-production. 
However, the gravest danger in a world re-enchanted by technological marvels 
and seduced by the power of reason was always going to be the inevitable 
thoughtlessness accompanying such total confidence. If technological rationality 
will be used for the moral and legal justification for war, then there will be no 
rational limit for the necessity of arming for defence: ‘it is logical that neither 
human endeavour nor bil- lions are spared. The race is run over the longest 
distances over the minutest time gains’ (Jünger, 2003a: 73). 
The ensuing century, operating through the universal claim to defend ‘freedom’ 
and ‘peace’, has been engaged in a colossal race to expand the technoscientific 
apparatus of security. Jünger’s cri- tique is one of the earliest to show how, in the 
modern technological world, war becomes converted into a process of continuous 
production of armaments. No conflict, local or global, is decided by a few short 
battles; security is not just an episode, but a continuous process demanding a 
collective  
national performance. Its prerequisite is that nothing is left out from the total 
plan of defensive mobilisation, that everything is ‘known’ and utilised, guarded 
and watched. Jünger (1981) asks, in 1932, ‘And, by the way, has not the science of 
our time already begun to see atoms no longer as the smallest particles, but as 
forms?’ (p. 16). Drawing theoretical physics into the politics of power expresses 
the fascination with the possible release of ‘endless’ energy under human 
command. The atom did indeed become the instrument for a politics able to claim 
the only ultimate power human- ity does possess: that of precise, calculable, 
unmistakeable self-destruction. The nuclear arms race was, and remains, the 
clearest expression that destruction had become a race for production, rather than a 
‘battle’ in any traditional sense. Concentrating the highest energies of reason, 
science and technology, the aim of the military system had changed subtly but 
radically: 
 
Now, we no longer point out arsenals, but only their keys. The mere display of such a 
key can be a deep deterrent. Temerity too shifts to another place; it is transferred onto the 




This passage seems to reflect the tone of the more recent conflict between 
North Korea and its enemies: a performative war of words and experiments whose 
aim is to be no more than a display of keys to power. 
Finally, one of the important questions is whether Jünger’s texts are strictly 
confined to analyses of war. As this review may have already suggested, Jünger’s 
critical range extends far beyond war itself. The core themes that connect his 
investigations to central concerns in the analysis and study of organisations and 
management are those of technology, reason, power and knowledge. In par- 
ticular, he examined how the permanent invocation of rationality allows the 
consolidation of the liberal state to unfold behind the mask of the protection of 
freedom. Jünger attempted to dissect and understand how social, political and 
cultural tensions inherent in systems of rational management are manifest in the 
spheres of production, exchange and consumption. These lines of inquiry have 
been of constant interest in the development of organisation studies. Jünger’s 
works are therefore part of a continuous and connected line of thinkers who 
placed at the core of their studies of insti- tutional orders the questions of 





1. This exact expression appears not only in Jünger’s texts but also in Henry 
Barbusse’s (2015) Le Feu (orig. 1917) and, a decade later, in Arnold Zweig’s 
(2000) The Case of Sergeant Grischa (orig. 1927). 
2. All the excerpts from this essay are translated from German by the authors. (An 
English translation has been published in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Richard Wolin, trans. by Joel Gold (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1993), pp. 122–39. However, at times, the published version bypasses some 
of the nuances essential to Jünger’s argument.) 
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